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recently took part in a debate in London organised by the think tank, Open Europe.  
 The  debate  first  examined  the  issues  that  might  arise  during  a  renegotiation  of  the 
United Kingdom’s terms of membership of the European Union. Discussions then turned to 
the terms the UK might achieve if, in a referendum on the results of such a renegotiation, 
voters in the UK decided to withdraw from the EU.  
These  questions  will  loom  large  if  the  Conservative  party  wins  an  overall  majority  in 
Parliament, which could happen after the 2015 general election, or after some subsequent 
general election, unless the Conservative party changes its policy. This is likely to be a live 
issue for many years to come. 
The issue could also be precipitated if the EU itself has to revise its treaties. Treaty revision 
would require the consent of the UK. Any UK government will be under pressure to use that 
treaty negotiation to press for the UK’s renegotiation agenda, which is partly why many EU 
leaders are unwilling to attempt any further treaty change. Internal UK politics could thus 
become a paralysing force on the politics of the entire European Union. 
The only place in the EU where the implications of a UK renegotiation or withdrawal are 
being debated at all is in the UK itself. That debate is narrowly focused on UK concerns, and 
takes  little  account  of  the  effect  on  the  27  other  member  states  of  the  EU,  including  on 
Ireland, of the various UK renegotiation or withdrawal scenarios. 
Other EU leaders appear to have taken a vow of silence on the UK’s internal debate, even 
though it is one in which their own electorates also have a vital interest. Understandably, 
they do not wish to aggravate UK public opinion, which might resent ‘foreign’ intervention 
in what would be construed, inaccurately, as a purely ‘domestic’ UK matter.  
The downside of this approach is that UK public and media opinion may develop unrealistic 
expectations of the terms it could achieve in any renegotiation, leading to disappointment, 
and  consequently,  increased  support  for  outright  withdrawal.  In  fact,  EU  countries  are 
already so integrated with one another that what the UK is likely to request is in fact a 
domestic issue for all members.  
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The UK needs to take account of opinion in other EU states. The consent of a majority of the 
other EU states will be needed if 
• a renegotiation is to be concluded to the satisfaction of the UK, or 
• if the UK is to withdraw from the EU, a majority among the other EU states would also be 
needed to agree the terms of a new EU relationship with the UK, to allow, for example,  
continued privileged access for the UK to the EU Single Market (e.g. for financial services). 
Neither of these eventualities can be taken for granted.  
The first question the UK should ask itself is whether it is in its national interest that the EU 
itself remains a viable and confident institution, which can make decisions with reasonable 
speed, once the various scenarios have played out.   
The precedent of an EU member state achieving preferential terms – because of a threat of 
withdrawal  from  the  EU  –  could  corrode  mutual  confidence  among  the  remaining  27 
members.   One has the sense that some in the UK do not care about this; others have not 
thought about it, and others would actually be happy if the whole process tore the EU apart.   
My own view is that, whether it is a member itself or not, the UK has a vested interest in the 
European Union remaining effective. An effective EU keeps Europe at peace, and creates a 
single open market that is good for British trade.  The UK would not sell as much in a Europe 
that had reverted to 27 different markets with 27 different currencies. An EU that could not 
make decisions because it is paralysed by fear about who might be next to follow the UK out 
the door would not be good for Britain. 
Furthermore,  some  of  the  likely  UK  proposals  in  a  renegotiation  would  undermine  the 
effectiveness and stability of the EU in an even more direct way. 
One such proposal is a so-called Red Card, whereby a minority of national parliaments could 
veto an EU law, even though that law 
• had already been passed by a majority in both the Council of Ministers, where all states, 
including the UK, would have had a vote, and 
• has been passed by a majority in the European Parliament, where all states including the 
UK have directly elected MEPs.  
This idea of a Red Card has won support from the British Foreign Secretary and even from 
some members of the Labour Party. 
The  ‘Fresh  Start  Group’  of  100  Conservative  MPs  has  gone  further,  by  saying  that  an 
unspecified group of national parliaments should be able to repeal existing EU laws, and 
bypass the European Parliament and the EU’s existing decision-making structures. 
This Red Card would paralyse EU decision-making in ways that might not suit the UK itself. 
It could also be used by others to block the very measures that the UK wants, such as the 
liberalisation of the services market in the EU. 
A provision whereby shifting majorities among national parliaments could bypass the EU’s 
democratic decision-making procedures, and unilaterally repeal EU laws and agreements, 
would undermine the stability of the EU Single Market. It would become an instrument for 
reopening long-settled compromises on which the EU Single Market is based; making them 
subject to populist pressures on an ongoing basis. 
Both these proposals would require treaty change, because the role of national parliaments in 
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legal status as an article in the treaties themselves. To change the protocol in question, each 
of the 28 member states and the European Parliament would have to agree.  
Another likely UK demand would be to opt out of having the European Court of Justice as 
the  final  adjudicator  on  disputes  concerning  the  meaning  of  EU  agreements  in  the  fight 
against crime. The UK is likely to demand that these issues be adjudicated in national courts, 
which  could  mean  28  different  interpretations,  and  many  new  loopholes  through  which 
well-advised criminals could evade justice. 
If the UK electorate is not satisfied with the terms offered to keep the UK in the EU, and 
votes that the UK should withdraw from the EU, a new negotiation would start. The purpose 
of this would be to decide on the terms under which the UK, outside the EU, would have 
access to the EU for its people, goods, and services. This second negotiation would have to 
be concluded within two years. 
It would be conducted under Article 50 of the EU Treaty, which requires a qualified majority 
in the European Council and a majority in the European Parliament to agree the terms to be 
granted to a country withdrawing from the EU. It is likely that such terms would include a 
continuing financial contribution to the EU budget, in return for UK access to the EU Single 
Market. 
In the event of no agreement being reached within the two-year deadline, the UK would be 
out of the EU, and automatically subject to restrictions and tariffs on its exports of goods and 
services to EU countries. Customs posts would have to be reintroduced at the border in 
Ireland and at cross-Channel ports. 
Furthermore, if the UK, then outside the EU, wanted to restrict immigration from the EU, it 
would  have  to  introduce  passport  controls  at  the  Irish  border;  a  measure  that  would 
undermine the work done so far to promote peace and reconciliation. 
 
 
 